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KMT Chair Cheng Defends Cross‑Strait Dialogue While Reassuring U.S. on Taiwan’s Defense

Her Washington meetings highlight U.S. concern over Taiwan’s trimmed defense budget, with a US$14 billion arms sale pending White House review.

Cheng Li-wun, the chairperson of Taiwan's main opposition Nationalist Party, or Kuomintang (KMT), speaks with reporters during a news conference on Friday, June 12, 2026, in Washington. (AP Photo/Mark Schiefelbein)
Cheng Li-wun, the chairperson of Taiwan's main opposition Nationalist Party, or Kuomintang (KMT), speaks with reporters during a news conference on Friday, June 12, 2026, in Washington. (AP Photo/Mark Schiefelbein)
Cheng Li-wun, the chairperson of Taiwan's main opposition Nationalist Party, or Kuomintang (KMT), speaks with reporters during a news conference on Friday, June 12, 2026, in Washington. (AP Photo/Mark Schiefelbein)
Cheng Li-wun, the chairperson of Taiwan's main opposition Nationalist Party, or Kuomintang (KMT), speaks with reporters during a news conference on Friday, June 12, 2026, in Washington. (AP Photo/Mark Schiefelbein)

Overview

  • Cheng Li‑wun met several U.S. senators and representatives this week to explain the Kuomintang’s pro‑dialogue approach and to respond to criticism from U.S. lawmakers.
  • She told U.S. officials the KMT supports Taiwan’s defense and opposes permanent secession, saying dialogue with Beijing does not mean giving up military deterrence or democratic freedoms.
  • Local Taiwanese reports say a planned meeting with senior U.S. National Security Council officials was downgraded and later canceled, a departure from past practice that drew attention in Washington.
  • Taiwan’s legislature approved a smaller special defense package capped at about NT$780 billion after the Cabinet’s larger NT$1.25 trillion proposal, raising questions about procurement priorities and oversight.
  • A roughly US$14 billion U.S. arms sale to Taiwan remains under presidential review, and some U.S. lawmakers warned that lower spending and pro‑engagement rhetoric could weaken deterrence and affect U.S. policy toward Beijing.